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Bounded Rationality and the Search for Organizational Architecture:  An Evolutionary 
Perspective on the Design of Organizations and their Evolvability  
 
Abstract 
 
The problem of designing, managing, and coordinating the efforts of different parts of complex 
organizations is central to the management and organizations literature. A central element, in 
turn, of Simon’s (1962) argument, which provides a foundation for understanding complex 
organizations, is that the fundamental properties of complex systems are hierarchy and near-
decomposability. These dual properties are argued to enhance the evolvability of such systems. 
A critical question, however, is whether boundedly rational managers will be able to identify and 
uncover some true, latent structure of hierarchy and decomposability. This question is intimately 
related to broader issues of concern to organization theory including the usefulness and value of 
design efforts and the implications of organizational change processes. In an effort to unite 
Simon’s ideas about complexity with mainstream organization theory, we address three research 
questions: (1) how does the architecture or structure of complexity affect the feasibility and 
usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts; (2) do efforts to adapt in the space of 
organizational forms complicate or complement the effectiveness of first-order change efforts; 
(3)  to what extent does the rate of environmental change nullify the usefulness of design efforts. 
We employ a computational model of organizational adaptation to examine these questions. Our 
results, in identifying the boundary conditions around successful design efforts, suggest that the 
underlying architecture of complexity of organizations, particularly the presence of hierarchy, is 
a critical determinant of the feasibility and effectiveness of design efforts. We also find that 
design efforts are generally complementary to efforts at local performance improvement and 
identify specific contingencies that determine that extent of complementarity. We discuss the 
implications of our findings for organization theory and design and also the burgeoning literature 
on modularity in products and organizations. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Simon’s (1962) the Architecture of Complexity provides the foundation for viewing 
organizations, as well as other systems such as products or technologies, as complex adaptive 
systems (Cohen and Axelrod, 1999). A central element of Simon’s argument is that the 
fundamental features of complex systems are hierarchy, the fact that some decisions or structures 
provide constraints on lower-level decisions or structures, and near-decomposability, the fact that 
patterns of interactions among elements of a system are not diffuse but will tend to be tightly 
clustered into nearly isolated sub-sets of interactions. These dual properties of hierarchy and 
near-decomposability are argued to enhance the evolvability of such systems.  While hierarchy 
and near-decomposability may be desirable attributes of an adaptive entity, how can we presume 
that boundedly-rational managers will be able to identify and uncover some true, latent structure 
of hierarchy and near-decomposability? This is a particularly important question for the growing 
literature on the power of modular organizational and product architectures (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) that has offered considerable insight regarding the power of 
modular designs but has left largely unaddressed the question of the feasibility of boundedly 
rational actors identifying more or less appropriate modular architectures.  
The essential tension between designing complex systems that are hierarchical and 
nearly-decomposable and the limits to rationality of human agents is captured in the following 
passage from Simon (1962): 
“The fact, then, that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierarchic 
structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, to describe, and even to 
see such systems and their parts. Or perhaps the proposition should be put the other way 
round. If there are important systems in the world that are complex without being 
hierarchic, they may to a considerable extent escape our observation and our 
understanding. Analysis of their behavior would involve such detailed knowledge and 
calculation of the interactions of their elementary parts that it would be beyond our 
capacities of memory or computation. I shall not try to settle which is chicken and which 
is egg: whether we are able to understand the world because it is hierarchic, or whether it 
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appears hierarchic because those aspects of it which are not elude our understanding and 
observation. I have already given some reasons for supposing that the former is at least 
half the truth – that evolving complexity would tend to be hierarchic – but it may not be 
the whole truth” (Simon, 1962: 477-478, Emphases added) 
In the quote above, Simon raises the puzzle about the direction of causality between 
bounded rationality and complexity. Does bounded rationality allow us to perceive and analyze 
only hierarchical systems, or is it that because complex systems are hierarchical that we are able 
to observe and analyze them. The essential question remains: to what extent is the architecture of 
complexity (i.e., hierarchy and decomposability) the ultimate arbiter of feasible design efforts. 
This question is intimately related to a central research agenda in organization theory 
concerning the design of organization forms. Two contrasting themes in organization theory 
provide the starting point for thinking about the feasibility and value of adaptation in the space of 
organization forms themselves. Contingency arguments implicitly assume that high-level actors 
within an organization are able to identify and comprehend the demands imposed by their current 
environment and are able to design the appropriate organizational architecture to respond to 
those demands. The role of the manager is, therefore, to respond to the changing environment by 
continuously adapting to the contingencies that confront the organization (Astley and Van de Ven, 
1983).  The research in this tradition, however, has devoted little attention to the feasibility and 
efficacy of adaptation in the space of organizational forms, focusing instead on the fit between 
environmental contingencies and organizational forms and the nature of lower-order adaptation 
or flexibility that different organizational forms make possible.   
Population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), in contrast, argue quite explicitly 
about the difficulty of identifying what form may seem most apt for a particular environment or 
niche and, furthermore, make salient the challenges of shifting from one form to another. This 
perspective highlights the limits to the degree of strategic choice and the capacity of organization 
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structures to adapt to different niches (Aldrich, 1979). Moreover, even if organizations are able to 
engage in adaptation in the space of organizational forms, if the rate of environmental change is 
faster than the rate at which organizations can adapt their organizational forms, then such 
adaptation efforts are likely to be fruitless (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  
The roots of the contrasting positions of the contingency and the ecological views are 
embedded in both implicit and explicit assumptions about individual behavior underlying 
adaptive efforts in the space of organization forms and the complexity of the challenge 
represented by such efforts. As contingency theories of fit between environmental contingencies 
and organization design features depend crucially on the ability of managers to discover and 
achieve such a fit, it is important to examine whether managers, viewed more realistically as 
“boundedly rational”, can indeed engage in effective adaptation in the space of organization 
forms to achieve such a fit with the environment. At the same time, if the relative futility of 
managerial action or the benefits of inertia really depends on the rate of change in the 
environment, then it is also useful to examine the relationship between the rate of environmental 
change and the effectiveness of efforts at adaptation. 
A related theme, but treated largely as a distinct line of work, is the examination of first- 
and second-order change processes (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Bartunek, 1984; Miner and 
Mezias, 1996; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). First-order change is viewed as incremental, local 
adaptation within a given structure (e.g., changes in pricing policies, product launches or 
withdrawals, changes in investments in R&D or advertising) involving the working out of 
specific choices within a given organizational structure. In contrast, second-order change 
represents change in the underlying structure itself (e.g., change from a unitary to M-form 
structure). Related to the prior questions of whether change in the space of organizational forms 
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is feasible and useful and how it is influenced by environmental change, are questions related to 
the interrelationship between first and second-order change processes.   
The interrelationship between first-order and second-order adaptation is far from 
straightforward. On the one hand, since first-order adaptation is likely to yield diminishing 
returns as the space of possibilities within an existing organizational architecture is exhausted, a 
major shift in the organizational form (via second-order adaptation) may enhance the 
effectiveness of first-order adaptation by creating new configurations for experimentation 
(Levinthal, 1997), much as breakthrough innovations set the stage for subsequent refinements 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Empirical research on learning curves (Argote, et al., 1990) and 
quality improvement efforts support this possibility. On the other hand, aggressive second-order 
adaptation can undo the learning and first-order adaptations of the past, creating conditions akin 
to the liability of newness (Amburgey, et al., 1993). The ambiguity of predictions suggests that it 
is useful to examine the impact of second-order adaptation on the efficacy of first-order 
adaptation and the circumstances under which they are complementary or conflicting. 
We wish to connect Simon the “system designer” who exposes the power of hierarchical 
and nearly-decomposable systems with Simon the forceful proponent for the notion of bounded 
rationality.  Uniting Simon’s contrasting ideas about “bounded rationality” and “complex system 
design”, we seek to address three questions that speak to the literature on organization design and 
change processes: (1) how does the architecture or structure of complexity affect the feasibility 
and usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts; (2) do efforts to adapt in the space of 
organizational forms complicate or complement the effectiveness of first-order change efforts; 
(3)  to what extent does the rate of environmental change nullify the usefulness of design efforts.  
In the process of addressing these questions, we hope to delineate at least a skeleton of a micro-
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foundation for some of the important “macro” questions regarding the design and evolution of 
organizational forms. 
We examine these questions in the context of a computational model of organizational 
adaptation. Such a methodological approach has the virtue that it allows us to examine the 
complex interaction among search processes at different levels of analysis (the space of 
alternative structures and the set of alternative actions) and, in a controlled manner, to consider 
how these processes are affected by different environmental settings and varying degrees of 
environmental change. As a model, by necessity, it comprises a stylized representation of actual 
processes of organizational adaptation. We build closely on prior work on models of 
organizational adaptation (Lant and Mezias, 1990; Levinthal, 1997) and specify a process of 
adaptive search for organizational form that roughly parallels these existing specifications of 
local search processes. Our characterization of an organizational form focuses on the 
segmentation or departmentalization of activity and the allocation of specific functions to a 
particular organizational subunit (c.f., Marengo, et al., 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). This 
is not to suggest that there are not other important facets of an organization’s form one might 
want to consider, including the informal pattern of interaction among actors or some notion of 
values or organizational culture. However, as Scott (1998: 26) suggests, a distinctive feature of 
organizations are their “relatively formalized social structures” and these features of structure 
upon which we do focus comprise the central elements that are manipulated in the process of 
restructuring (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). 
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2.  Complex organizations and their environments 
2.1.  Complex organizations and the design problem 
 Building on the work of Simon (1962: 468) and Perrow (1972), complex organizational 
systems can be characterized as consisting of a large number of elements that interact in a non-
simple2 way. The complexity that stems from a large number of elements interacting in non-
trivial ways is two-fold. First, the large number of elements creates difficulty in comprehending 
the structure that binds them. Second, even if one is able to uncover and comprehend the 
structure that binds the elements, anticipating the effects of the interactions on system behavior 
and performance is non-trivial (Cohen and Axelrod, 1999; Kauffman, 1993). The complexity 
increases as the system gets larger since designers need to first discover which elements interact 
with which others and then discover the nature of the interaction relationship (see Perrow, 1999 
Chapter 3 for an extensive discussion of the distinguishing aspects of complex systems). The 
following quote describing the complexity of Xerox’s photocopiers (Adler and Borys, 1996) 
vividly portrays the difficulty inherent in comprehending and intervening in complex structures: 
During the 1970s, Xerox photocopiers grew vastly more sophisticated in their 
functionality. As a result, even simple tasks such as copying, loading paper, and 
resupplying ink became more complex, and recovery from routine problems such as 
paper jams became more difficult. It became increasingly common for users to walk 
away from the machine rather than waste time trying to work out how to clear a paper 
jam or replace the ink supply. This resulted in unnecessary downtime and expensive 
service calls (Adler and Borys, 1996: 68). 
 Similarly, Chandler’s (1962) description of Du Pont’s growing pains highlights the 
challenges of complexity in an organizational setting: 
The essential difficulty was that diversification greatly increased the demands on the 
company’s administrative offices. Now the different departmental headquarters had to 
                                                 
2 For instance, predicting system behavior is relatively easy if the interactions between the elements are linear. On 
the other hand, if elements interact such that the relationship within and between then is non-linear, i.e., positive 
over some range and negative or unrelated over other ranges, then predicting system performance becomes a 
difficult problem. 
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coordinate, appraise, and plan policies and procedures for plants, or sales offices, or 
purchasing agents, or technical laboratories in a number of quite different 
industries…Coordination became more complicated because different products called for 
different types of standards, procedures, and policies…Appraisal of departments 
performing in diverse fields became exceedingly complex. Interdepartmental 
coordination grew comparably more troublesome. The manufacturing personnel and the 
marketers tended to lose contact with each other and so failed to work out product 
improvements and modifications to meet changing demands and competitive 
developments…(Chandler, 1962: 91). 
The problem of adaptive change in such settings is made even more salient, particularly if we 
assume managers are boundedly rational, since any adaptive attempt is based on guesses about 
the nature of interactions and interaction relationships among organizational choices and 
decisions. 
 The design of complex organizations, in its simplest form, invokes two important 
principles: reductionism, the breaking up of a complex whole into simpler units, and division of 
labor, grouping of tasks or units based on similarity in function. The two principles serve to 
economize on the cognitive demands placed on the designer (Miller, 1956) and also minimize 
redundancies in task performance. This idea has persisted in and remained central to the ideas of 
more recent organization theorists, albeit under various labels such as nearly decomposable 
systems (Simon, 1962), loosely-coupled systems (Weick, 1976), or pooled, sequential, and 
reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967). 
 Among the many coordination benefits of specialization and division of labor, one of the 
most important ones from an adaptive standpoint is the potential for relatively autonomous 
adaptation within the specialized units or departments. This allows for localized adaptation 
within problematic parts of the organization, while simultaneously buffering the unaffected parts 
(Thompson, 1967) or engaging in parallel and simultaneous adaptive attempts in different 
departmental units (see Weick, 1976: 6-9 for seven adaptive benefits of loose coupling).  
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 A second basic principle for dealing with complexity is the notion of hierarchy. 
Specialization or division of labor can help eliminate redundancies and duplication of effort. 
However, the decisions or activities that are compartmentalized still may need to be coordinated. 
Among other roles, hierarchy serves the important function of the temporal ordering of activities 
and helps eliminate endless cycling in their performance. Using the fable of the two 
watchmakers, Simon (1962) suggests that complex systems that resemble hierarchies tend to 
evolve faster and toward a stable, self-reproducing form as compared with non-hierarchic 
systems. The property of hierarchy is argued to be found not by chance, but favored by 
evolutionary selection processes.  
 The notion of hierarchy is often used interchangeably with “organizational fiat” 
(Williamson, 1975) or authority (see Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003 for an implementation of 
hierarchy as authority using a modeling structure similar to ours). Rather, in this paper, the 
notion of hierarchy is used in the sense of nested hierarchies (Baum and Singh, 1994) where 
there is a precedence ordering of tasks or activities in the organization. In the context of 
organization design, the line of hierarchy denotes the flow of information, or constraints, from 
the immediately higher department or unit. Similarly, in an organizational context, Simon’s 
(1957) notion of decision premises has the property of a nested set of constraints on 
organizational decision-making. The important function of hierarchy is not only to resolve 
conflicts between sub-systems (Thompson, 1967: 60), but also to facilitate learning through trial 
and error by allowing systematic and orderly local search and exploration. Hierarchy enables the 
recognition of progress towards one’s goals and the evolution of a system through several 
intermediate stable configurations (Perrow, 1972: 44-52). In contrast, non-hierarchic systems, 
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which display no particular order in their configuration, make local search and trial and error 
learning much more difficult to accomplish. 
 Interestingly, Xerox’s response (Adler and Borys, 1996) to the growing complexity of its 
copiers and that of Du Pont to its diversification (Chandler, 1962) was to redesign their product 
and organization, respectively, conforming to the twin principles of decomposability and 
hierarchy: 
Through its physical structure and the displays it offered, the machine provided a 
succession of informative views of the copier’s functioning and of the user’s interaction 
with it at various stages of the copying experience. As the views unfolded, they helped 
users form mental models of the machine’s subsystems and of the experience of 
interacting with those subsystems. The views included step-by-step presentations of 
machine subsystems, their functions, and the corresponding task sequences. The views 
supported copying tasks by talking the users through them – neither concealing 
information nor overloading users with incomprehensible or unrelated information. The 
interiors, for example, were designed to express various layers and degrees of interaction 
to users and service people. The user-accessible components of the interiors (such as 
paper-loading, jam clearing, and simple maintenance) were placed in the foreground of 
the visual field, and the technician-accessible components of the interior (for more 
complex maintenance and repairs) were placed in receding layers in the background 
(Adler and Borys, 1996: 68-69).  
No member of the Executive Committee should have direct individual authority or 
responsibility which he would have if he was in charge of one or more functional 
activities of the Company…For example, our plan provides that one member of the 
Executive Committee, who may be best fitted by experience for his duty, will coordinate 
the sales function by holding regular meetings with appropriate representatives of the five 
Industrial Departments…According to this plan, the head of each Industrial Department 
will have full authority and responsibility for the operation of his industry, subject only to 
the authority of the Executive Committee as a whole. He will have under him men who 
will exercise all the line functions necessary for a complete industry, including routine 
and special purchasing, manufacture, sales, minor construction…(Chandler, 1962: 107) 
The description of the copier redesign effort and the restructuring of Du Pont invoke the 
twin principles of complex system architecture advocated by Simon (1962): decomposability and 
hierarchy. The design of the copier into subsystems and concealing irrelevant information within 
modules or subsystems (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) corresponds to near decomposability or the 
loose-coupling of structural elements. Similarly, identifying task sequences and separating the 
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various layers and degrees of interaction is consistent with the principle of hierarchy. By the 
same token, the creation of multiple, autonomous divisions in Du Pont corresponds to the 
principle of decomposability, i.e., group activities that are strongly interdependent, whereas the 
members of the Executive Committee approximate the principle of hierarchy in achieving 
coordination where inter-departmental interdependence was involved. While the flexibility and 
coordination benefits of design architectures that are hierarchical and nearly decomposable are 
widely reported in the literature (Adler, et al., 1999; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967), how one discovers or designs such an architecture for a complex product or 
organization is relatively underexplored. The design challenge is compounded when we 
consider, not omniscient designers, but, boundedly rational designers engaging in local and 
imperfect search in the space of design possibilities. Does the tractability of the design challenge 
for boundedly rational agents vary with the underlying architecture of the complex problem? We 
propose to explore this complex design challenge in a setting where there is an explicit 
recognition of the limits to the adaptive and inferential capacity of the design effort. 
2.3.  Contingent Logic of Alternative Environments 
 As suggested above, we focus on two aspects of organization design: (1) how to group 
organizational functions into two or more departments or units; and, (2) specify the hierarchy of 
information flow or task ordering between the departments. As a result, the critical features of 
the environment from the perspective of our analysis is the net effect of task, technology, and 
institutions, on the choices of the number and nature of departments and the information flow 
between them. Consistent with contingency logic, there should be some ordering among the set 
of possible organizational forms based on their fit with a given set of environmental conditions – 
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different groupings of organizational choices and the direction of information flow among them 
will vary in their efficacy, depending on the myriad environmental influences at work.  
 Accepting the existence of some inherent contingency logic regarding the desirability of 
alternative forms, if managers make guesses about structures and observe the consequences of 
their choices, it is reasonable to expect to observe (boundedly rational) efforts at adaptive 
organizational change. For instance, if a multinational corporation (MNC) operating in several 
countries all over the world employs a functional structure to coordinate its activities and 
observes the dysfunctional effects of the uniformity of policies in different countries, such 
information constitutes feedback about the inappropriate grouping of organizational choices and 
functions. It is reasonable to expect the managers of the MNC to engage in efforts to adapt the 
organization structure in the light of such feedback. While bounded rationality suggests that they 
are unlikely to discover the appropriate structure in the first attempt, it is certainly possible that 
repeated, small adaptive attempts will generate progress toward the appropriate structure. 
 There is, however, a second complication. The adaptive walk toward discovering the 
appropriate structure of a complex organization given its environment is likely to be relatively 
effective only if the environment is itself stationary. Over time, the MNC might enter or exit 
from different technologies, countries, and businesses, making the appropriate structure defined 
by the environment a moving target. What constituted an appropriate grouping of organizational 
functions at one time might be inappropriate at another time point. This brings us back to the 
central questions posed in this paper. Can boundedly rational managers of complex organizations 
engage in effective design activities in the space of organizational forms given that the 
environment which defines the appropriate organizational form is itself changing?  
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2.3.  First-order and second-order adaptation 
 The roots of the distinction between first-order and second-order change processes can be 
traced to Argyris and Schön (1978). First-order adaptation occurs within the parameters of an 
existing architecture or design and is geared to improving performance and finding durable fixes 
and solutions to identified problems (Bartunek, 1984). For instance, in the photocopier example, 
first order adaptation would involve incremental tweaks to the design, such as making it easier to 
open a door to remove paper jams or load paper. Such incremental changes are a result of 
cumulative learning-by-doing over long periods of time (Adler and Clark, 1991; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). In contrast, second order adaptation involves a change in the existing architecture 
itself. Thus, fundamental shifts in strategy or structure would fall within the ambit of second-
order change (Bartunek, 1984). Analogously, adaptation in the space of organizational forms or 
designs is akin to second-order adaptation, whereas incremental adaptation within a given 
organizational form is akin to first-order adaptation (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). The obvious 
downside risk of second-order adaptation is the obliteration of prior first-order adaptation efforts 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). For instance, with a complete re-design of the architecture of 
the copier, the difficulty of retaining all the incremental first-order adaptive efforts of the past is 
quite apparent. Often, realizing the full benefits of second-order adaptation requires the 
elimination of prior first-order adaptations.  
 On the upside, second-order adaptation can open up new opportunities for successful 
first-order adaptation efforts. This is because opportunities for first-order adaptation often exhibit 
diminishing returns over time. In complex interdependent systems, first-order adaptation efforts 
are rarely costless. Improvement in one dimension often comes at the cost of deterioration in one 
or more other dimensions. As more and more such adaptations are carried out, the available 
opportunities for productive adaptation declines over time (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In 
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such cases, a change in the architecture or second-order adaptation can create new opportunities 
for first-order adaptation (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  
 The preceding discussion hints at a trade-off between first-order and second-order 
adaptation. But what is unclear is the precise nature of the trade-off. The empirical literature in 
organization theory remains inconclusive. Carroll and Hannan (2000) present a list of 15 papers 
in organization theory with eleven studies finding a positive relationship between organizational 
change and mortality and eight [some studies show both findings] studies document a negative 
relationship. Carroll and Hannan (2000) suggest that changes in core aspects of organizations are 
likely to threaten survival, while incremental and peripheral changes are likely to be less 
disruptive. However, as a field we need greater conceptual clarity as to what constitutes core 
versus peripheral changes. As an initial step in this direction, we seek to examine the boundary 
conditions under which first-order and second-order adaptations are complements and the 
conditions under which they counteract each other. 
In sum, we seek to investigate three distinct, but interrelated questions that comprise the 
foundational structure of organization theory: (1) how does the architecture or structure of 
complexity affect the feasibility and usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts; (2) to what 
extent does the rate of environmental change nullify the usefulness of design efforts; and, (3) 
how does second-order adaptation – design efforts – affect first-order adaptation – incremental 
performance improvement efforts. The first question speaks to the fundamental dilemma of 
causality between bounded rationality and complexity posed by Simon (1962). The next two 
questions examine how our understanding of environmental change and organizational 
adaptation processes tempers the practical usefulness of design efforts. In other words, does the 
primacy of environmental and organizational change processes overwhelm the feasibility and/or 
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functionality of organization design efforts? The following section describes a formal modeling 
structure that we set up to explore the research questions outlined above.  
3.  Model3 
The first question we sought to investigate was how the architecture of complexity affects 
the feasibility and usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts. In addressing this question, 
we sought to hold constant the boundedly rational nature of the search processes and contrast the 
relative effectiveness  of this search process as the architecture of complexity varies. Toward this 
end, we set up four alternative states of the world (what we term generative structures from 
hereon) that vary in the nature of the underlying complexity discussed above – decomposability 
and hierarchy: (1) hierarchical and loosely-coupled (cf. Figure 1a); (2) non-hierarchical and 
loosely-coupled (cf. Figure 1b); (3) hierarchical and tightly-coupled (cf. Figure 1c); and, (4) non-
hierarchical and tightly-coupled (cf. Figure 1d) 4 . In the figures, an alphanumeric notation 
represents each decision variable. The alphabetic portion denotes the department, while the 
numeric portion denotes the respective decision choice. The x’s in each row-column intersection 
identify interdependence between decision choices. Reading across a row, an “x” indicates that 
the row variable is affected by the column variable. Conversely, reading down a column, an “x” 
indicates that the column variable affects the row variable. Therefore, x’s positioned 
symmetrically above and below the principal diagonal represents reciprocal interdependence 
between decision choices. 
 Within each department, each decision choice is tightly-coupled with other decision 
choices in the same department – what Thompson (1967) terms reciprocal dependence. Figure 1a 
                                                 
3 In the interest of readability, details of the formal implementation are provided in a separate technical appendix. 
4 Note that Figures 1a-1d bear a resemblance to two recent published papers (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Rivkin 
and Siggelkow, 2003). The similarity is a function of the common modeling apparatus employed. The research 
questions examined here, however, share no overlap with the research questions of either of these two papers. 
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depicts a structure that is hierarchical and loosely-coupled, i.e., departments 2 and 3 have a 
weakly coupled relationship with the next higher department, denoted by a single x below the 
principal diagonal. The presence (absence) of hierarchy is identified by the asymmetry 
(symmetry) in between-department interaction. The degree of loose coupling is a function of the 
strength (magnitude) of between department interactions. If there are no interactions between 
departments, then the organization is fully de-coupled. In Figure 1a, decision a2 influences the 
payoff associated with decision b3. This also corresponds to sequential or hierarchical 
interdependence between departments (Thompson, 1967). 
<< Insert Figures 1a-1d here >> 
 Figure 1b denotes a loosely-coupled but non-hierarchical structure. The structure is still 
loosely-coupled, since the interaction within departments is stronger than interaction between 
departments. However, the structure is not hierarchical, since there is no precedence ordering of 
activities between the departments. Departments ‘a’ and ‘b’ are characterized by reciprocal 
interdependence (Thompson, 1967) and symmetry in between-department interactions. Figure 1c 
describes a hierarchical, but tightly-coupled structure. The interaction between departments ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ and departments ‘b’ and ‘c’ is as strong as the interaction within the respective 
departments. In this organization, however, hierarchy is preserved since there is only sequential 
interdependence between departments, i.e., department ‘a’ affects department ‘b’, but not vice 
versa. Finally, Figure 1d represents a non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled structure. In the four 
settings, the degree of coupling in Figure 1a and Figure 1b (and Figure 1c and 1d respectively) is 
held constant as the total number of interactions off the principal diagonal is equal.  
Each of the four structures, in a stylized manner, represents different contexts that 
managers encounter. For instance, the hierarchical and loosely-coupled structure might 
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characterize the relationship between the R&D and manufacturing departments of a 
pharmaceutical company. The process of drug discovery including drug development and 
clinical trials usually spans between 3.5 and 13 years (Dranove and Meltzer, 1994). Moreover, 
since the FDA approval rate for new drugs is only about 17-20 percent (DiMasi, 2001), it is 
likely that the R&D process is highly de-coupled from the manufacturing process with the latter 
emerging as a significant issue only after the FDA approval of the drug. This suggests that 
Figure 1a might be representative of the hierarchical and loosely-coupled relationship between 
R&D and manufacturing in pharmaceutical firms5. On the other hand, in more process intensive 
industries such as chemicals and semiconductors, it is likely that manufacturing considerations 
will be tightly-coupled with R&D decisions (Ulrich and Eppinger, 1999: 20). This leads us to 
expect that the R&D-manufacturing relationship in the semiconductor industry is likely to be 
non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled as in Figure 1d.  
Both situations are in contrast to the case where the relationship between R&D and 
manufacturing is loosely-coupled but mutually consultative in nature (i.e., Figure 1b), i.e., R&D 
iterates its designs based on input from manufacturing. This is likely to be the case in the 
automotive industry, though the strength of the relationship likely depends on the extent to which 
manufacturing cost considerations dominate (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Lastly, the relationship 
between R&D and manufacturing in the biotechnology industry seems representative of the 
hierarchical and tightly-coupled structure. A biotechnology product is a protein-based drug, in 
contrast to a pharmaceutical product which is chemical-based. Protein-based drugs are derived 
from living organisms, human blood and plasma, and proteins. As a result, the manufacturing 
                                                 
5 Note that in the pharmaceutical example there is a temporal separation between R&D and manufacturing. The 
meaning of hierarchy in our models is simply the unidirectional flow of decision constraints. Such unidirectional 
flow may be a result of temporal separation of decisions (as in the pharmaceutical example) or simply the ordering 
of decision constraints between sets of activities at a point in time (see Cusumano and Selby, 1998 for an example of 
how Microsoft partitions its decision constraints in organizing its software development activity). 
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process cannot be divorced from product development R&D. Thus, the separation between R&D 
and manufacturing that exists in chemical-based drugs is not possible in protein-based drugs 
(Dove, 2001) and leads us to expect that the R&D-manufacturing relationship in the latter will be 
hierarchical, but tightly-coupled as in Figure 1c. The descriptions of the four contrasting contexts 
of the R&D-manufacturing relationship suggest that the four structures might depict alternative 
states of the world, each of which might pose different design and coordination challenges. 
Addressing the three research questions posed earlier requires the specification of the 
following: (1) the four generative structures; (2) boundedly rational second-order adaptation; (3) 
boundedly rational first-order adaptation; (4) environmental change; and, (5) selection. The 
following sub-sections provide an intuitive explanation for the modeled processes. The attached 
appendix provides a formal description.  
3.1. Modeling the generative structures  
We represent an organization as a set of N decision variables, some subset of which is 
interdependent. For simplicity and without loss of generality, in our model each decision variable 
is assumed to take on two possible values (0,1). Thus, the space of possible organizational action 
consists of 2N possible sets of behaviors. For instance, if we consider the manufacturing strategy 
of a business firm, then a setting of 1 might represent a policy of outsourcing production activity 
and a setting of 0 might connote engaging in in-house manufacturing. It follows that different 
settings for the decision variables of the organization have different performance implications. 
Continuing with the organizational example, choices about production are likely to have 
interactions with the investments in information technology, rate of product introductions, and so 
on. For instance, it is conceivable that rapid and highly variable patterns of product introductions 
may enhance the value of outsourcing and of a sophisticated information technology system that 
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can link retail activity to external suppliers. In other words, some combinations of decision 
choices may yield performance improvements while others may undermine it (Macduffie, 1995).  
 The performance of the organization ultimately depends on the settings (1s or 0s) of the 
decision variables. However, the ability of the organization to engage in effective first-order 
adaptation and identify a more or less desirable set of choices is, in turn, a function of the 
organization’s structure --- in particular, the set of interactions among the decision choices, as 
described by Figures 1a-1d. When there are no interactions between decision variables, each 
decision makes an independent contribution to organizational performance. As the interactions 
between decision variables increase, the contribution of each decision variable to organizational 
performance becomes increasingly interdependent. Overall performance is an average of the 
performance contribution of individual decision variables.  
In modeling the four generative structures, there are both systematic and stochastic 
manifestations of each structure. First, the number of departments, D, was specified subject to 
the constraint that each department contained an equal number of decision choices. This was 
done so as to reduce the combinatorics of the possible structures we need to consider as we vary 
N and D.  In specifying the interaction structure across decision variables, we assume that, as 
depicted in the illustrative Figures 1a-1d, all decisions within a department interact with one 
another. Further, for the loosely-coupled structures, we assume that the number of cross-
departmental interactions is 2(D-1), or, on average, two interactions between each pair of 
departments. For the tightly-coupled structures, we assume that the number of interactions across 
departments are 2(N/D * N/D), or half the degree of within department interactions. While the 
magnitude of the degree of interactions is specified in this manner, the particular variables that 
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interact with one another are chosen randomly.6 Thus, overall interdependence in Figures 1a and 
1b (the loosely-coupled structures) was always equal, with hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
structures having the same total number of between department interactions. Similarly, in the 
case of the two tightly-coupled structures (Figures 1c and 1d) the total magnitude of between 
department interactions is the same.   
3.2.  Modeling boundedly rational second-order adaptation 
 We assume that managers make two organization design choices: (1) how many 
departments or units to create; and, (2) the assignment of functions to departments. We model an 
evolutionary search process wherein managers engage in boundedly rational adaptive attempts to 
discover superior structures as defined by the appropriate number of departments and the 
appropriate mapping of decision variables to departments in the context of one of the four 
underlying generative structures. We implement three search operators that collectively represent 
second-order adaptation: (1) splitting; (2) combining; and, (3) re-allocation.  
 Splitting may be seen as the breaking up of existing departments into two or more new 
departments. As departments within organizations grow larger, the same piece of information is 
likely to have to pass through a larger number of potentially redundant individuals before 
resulting in an action or decision. In such cases, splitting an existing department can help 
economize on information flow (Arrow, 1974). Splitting is also necessitated when a department 
is engaged in a number of unrelated activities, each of which requires different skills, people, 
and/or resources. In such settings, splitting facilitates differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967) among organizational units to allow specialization to their specific contexts.  
                                                 
6 We did robustness checks (available on request) that vary the degree of within department interactions and the 
treatment of loosely- versus tightly-coupled structures. The qualitative results remain as long as the ordering of the 
intensity of interactions remains the same, ranging in intensity from within department interactions, interactions 
across departments in the tightly coupled structure, to the degree of interactions across departments in the loosely-
coupled structure. 
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 Combining is simply the opposite of splitting. This is akin to combining or integrating 
two or more departments. From the seminal work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), we know that 
organizational structures are constantly balancing the contrasting forces of differentiation and 
integration. While pressures for local adaptation dictate greater differentiation, the pressures for 
broader efficiencies in organizational performance demand greater integration. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence that organizations often cycle between extended periods of increasing 
decentralization (differentiation) and increasing centralization (integration) (Cummings, 1995; 
Mintzberg, 1979; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002) suggesting that the combining operator might be 
an important counterpart to splitting.  
 In addition to the splitting and combining of departments, organizations often simply 
transfer or reassign functions from one subunit to another.  Such reorganization does not lead to 
a more (as in splitting) or less (as in combining) partitioning of tasks, but simply involves the re-
allocation or re-assignment of functions between departments. For instance, the shift from an 
organization structured along geographic lines to a product structure (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989) or from a functional structure to a product structure (Chandler, 1962) has no clear 
implication for the number of subunits, but obviously would involve the wholesale 
reconfiguration of organizational activity.7 Collectively, these operations of combining, splitting, 
and transfer are the mechanisms that generate change in both the number of departments within 
the organization and the assignment of decision variables to departments, what we consider to be 
an organization’s architecture.  
                                                 
7 In the context of the splitting and combining operators, we consider substantial, discrete points of restructuring.  
With respect to the transfer of activities, we examine reallocation of individual elements from one subunit to 
another, or what Eisenhardt and Brown (1999) refer to as a form of “patching”. Note, however, that such 
incremental efforts at reorganization can, over time, cumulate in broad changes. 
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 The inference involved in the three operations is boundedly rational. Managers employ 
the operations of splitting, combining, or transfer based on their understanding of whether one or 
more decision choices belong to their respective department. The inferential process is imperfect 
in that only pairs of departments are compared at a time and, furthermore, the examination of 
each department is only local. As a result, the eventual outcome of the attempts at redesign is not 
always functional from the organizational standpoint, thus rendering second-order adaptation 
imperfect. In addition, observing such patterns of influence does not assume that managers 
understand cause and effect processes at the department level. The only behavioral assumption 
made is that the designers are able to observe the effect of their actions through a crude form of 
“root cause” analysis  (Macduffie, 1997) (the formal specification of the splitting, combining, 
and transfer operators is provided in the technical appendix). 
3.3. Modeling boundedly rational first-order adaptation 
 First-order adaptation is implemented as follows. In each period of the experiment, the 
actors within each department attempt to enhance the performance of their particular department. 
Actors are assumed to “see” the performance of their given department and can anticipate what 
incremental changes from the existing decision string would imply for department performance. 
Thus, adaptation occurs through a process of off-line, local search implemented simultaneously 
in each of the departments (cf., Marengo, et al., 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003)8. Within 
each department, a decision choice is selected at random and actors within each department 
evaluate the efficacy of flipping the decision choice (0,1) by the criterion of improvement in 
department performance. The change is implemented if there is a perceived increase in 
                                                 
8 This capability, as suggested by Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003), may be a function of effective accounting systems 
that are able to facilitate the evaluation of department level performance.  Indeed, activity based costing is widely 
deployed to track the performance of organizational sub-units (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992).  
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department performance. However, since these change attempts occur in parallel in each of the 
departments and the departments may have some degree of interdependence, there is no 
presumption that these change efforts will in fact improve organizational performance, or even 
department performance.  
3.4. Modeling environmental change 
 Environmental change, according to the contingency view, causes a mis-alignment 
between organizational structures, choices, and environmental demands. As described in §3.2, 
managers engage in second-order adaptation in the space of organizational forms in order to 
align the organization structure with the unknown generative structure. A change in the 
environment will have at least two effects on organizations. First, environmental change can 
obviate prior first-order adaptations and in that sense environmental change can be competence 
destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Second, environmental change may render less 
appropriate a given organizational form (Stinchcombe, 1965).  For instance, continuing with the 
example of a multinational firm, if political change in the host country in which the firm operates 
increases the asset expropriation threat, then the old policies that guide investment and growth 
are unlikely to remain relevant. The organization’s managers now need to balance the pursuit of 
growth against the threat of expropriation.  
 To capture the effects of the possible obsolescence of organizational competence, as 
expressed in the reduced performance associated with the current set of policy choices, and the 
possible mis-alignment between environmental demands and the organization structure, we 
allow the environment to change every period with some probability, ∆. A stable environment is 
specified as ∆=0 and the environment changes every period with certainty when ∆=1. For all 
intermediate values of ∆, the environment changes probabilistically.  
 25
<< Insert Figure 1e here >> 
Specifically, following each environmental change, we re-specify the coupling of 
decision variables within departments and the nature of between-department interactions that 
makes up the generative structure. Contrasting Figure 1a with Figure 1e illustrates the effect of 
environmental change for the hierarchical and loosely-coupled structure. Two changes are visible 
in a comparison of the two figures. First, the composition of the departments is altered in the 
sense that decision variables subscripted a, b, and c are no longer clustered together in the same 
department. Second, the between-department interactions are altered as well. We implemented 
environmental change in the three other structures along similar lines9. Given the newly specified 
structure, the performance landscape is re-seeded to generate a new mapping between decision 
variables and performance outcomes. We note that the form of environmental change we 
implement is best described as radical in the sense that all prior adaptations and learning is 
destroyed after the environmental change. We recognize that such radical change is perhaps quite 
rare. Change, more often, tends to be incremental and tends to devalue some prior adaptations 
while preserving others. In this sense, this characterization of environmental change is relatively 
favorable to the possibility of useful  second-order adaptation efforts.  As one moves along the 
continuum from a stable to a radically changing environment, the value of second-order change 
efforts changes commensurately. 
3.5. Modeling selection 
 Organizational selection processes are modeled as being proportionate to fitness. The 
probability that an organization will be selected equals its performance level divided by the sum 
of the performance of all organizations in the population at that time. This is a standard 
                                                 
9  We also implemented environmental change as triggering also a change in the number of departments that 
represent the generative structures. The results were identical and are available with the authors on request. 
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assumption in modeling biological processes (Wilson and Bossert, 1971) and has been used in a 
number of models of organizational selection (see Lant and Mezias, 1990, 1992; see Levinthal, 
1997). 
4.  Analysis 
For each run of the model, a generative structure is specified as characterized in section 
3.1. In addition to initializing the performance landscape, the states (0,1) of the vector of 
decision choices are drawn at random at the start of an experiment. Since any single run is 
sensitive to the inherent randomness in both the initial states of the decision choices and the 
initialization of the performance landscape, we replicated each experiment 100 times with 
different starting seeds for both the specification of the performance landscape and the starting 
state of the system. The reported results, unless mentioned otherwise, are averaged over the 100 
runs to remove the stochastic component endemic to any single run. Figure 1f illustrates an 
interaction matrix for a single organization at the start of a typical experiment. As can be seen 
from the figure, the starting organization design contains unequal sized departments with no 
systematic pattern of interactions among decision choices. In each run we generate 100 
organizations where for each organization the number of departments and the allocation of 
activities to departments is randomly specified, as are the settings for the decision choices. Thus, 
at the start of each run there are typically 100 different organizational forms, each of which 
independently engages in second-order adaptation. 
<< Insert Figure 1f here >> 
4.1.  The architecture of complexity and the effectiveness of design efforts  
The first experiment seeks to answer the question, how does the architecture of 
complexity affect the feasibility and usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts (i.e., second-
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order adaptation). The second-order adaptation challenge entails discovering the set of 
interactions among the N decision variables and clustering those decision variables that seem to 
have strong interactions with each other. We examine whether the problem of second-order 
adaptation is tractable and whether and how it varies systematically with the architecture of 
complexity.   
A key performance variable we track is the number of organizational forms as the 
simulation progresses. If second-order adaptation is fully successful, then the number of 
organizational forms would converge to one, i.e., the generative structure that represents the 
correct number of departments and the correct mapping of decision choices to the departments. 
This is an important performance metric since, as Simon (1962) points out, an important goal of 
organization design is to reach evolutionary stability. In the absence of any degree of stability, 
the efficacy of adaptation efforts is impaired.  
Figure 2 plots the number of organizational forms (averaged over 100 runs) as the 
simulation progressed in each of the four generative structures. The figure shows that as long as 
the structure is hierarchical, even at extreme levels of tight coupling (Figure 1c) where all 
decision choices of one department affect all decision choices of the immediately succeeding 
department (i.e., all decision choices of department 1 affects all decision choices of department 2 
and so on), the process of second-order adaptation is always able to discover and stabilize on the 
corresponding generative structure used to generate the performance landscape. On the other 
hand, when we introduced reciprocal interaction between departments, i.e., the generative 
structure is non-hierarchical (Figures 1b and 1d), organizations never manage to reach a stable 
state. In the non-hierarchical and loosely-coupled structure (Figure 1b), organizations converge 
on the generative structure most of the time, but the violation of hierarchy triggers instability 
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with about six different organizational forms continuing to survive even at the end of the 
experiment. In the case of the non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled structure (Figure 1d), the 
violation of both principles (hierarchy and loose-coupling) results in the generative structure 
never being identified. The initial diversity of organizational forms continues to be preserved, 
suggesting that second-order adaptation is relatively ineffective. 
<< Insert Figure 2 here >> 
We examined the sensitivity of the results in Figure 2 for changes in the size of the 
organization (i.e., N) and the number of underlying departments (i.e., D). We find that the results 
are robust to changes in both the size of the organization and the number of underlying 
departments10. We observed an approximately linear positive relationship between organization 
size and the time periods to converge on the generative structure.11 
4.1.1.  The impact of environmental change on design efforts 
 In the previous section, we saw that managers were able to successfully converge on the 
underlying generative structure when such structures were hierarchical. These results were 
observed in a stable environment. However, environments are rarely stable over long periods of 
time and, as a result, the question arises as to whether second-order adaptation efforts continue to 
be effective when the environment changes periodically. We re-ran the models presented above 
introducing environmental change every period with a probability of ∆=0.05 (see §3.4 for a 
description of how environmental change was implemented).  
<< Insert Figure 3 here >> 
                                                 
10 These results are not attached due to space constraints and are available from the authors. 
11 In sharp contrast, Schaefer (1999) finds that, in general, with a randomly specified structure, the problem of 
identifying the correct modularization of an organizational (or product) design is NP-complete (Garey and Johnson, 
1990).   
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 The results with environmental change are presented in Figure 3. Whenever 
environmental change occurs, the cumulative adaptations of the previous periods are rendered 
ineffective and the organization designs are no longer aligned with the changed generative 
structure. The second-order adaptation efforts of the past are effectively reset and the process 
begins again. From the figure, we observe that the effectiveness of second-order adaptation in the 
presence of environmental change is considerably reduced. About 25-35 organizational forms 
continue to survive in both the loosely-coupled structures (both with and without hierarchy) and 
the hierarchical and tightly-coupled structure. The non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled structure, 
as in the case of the stable environment, makes the least progress in the process of second-order 
adaptation and, in this case, the initial diversity of organizational forms continues to persist.  
 The pattern of results suggests that the effectiveness of second-order adaptation in the 
presence of environmental change is likely to be sensitive to two parameter settings of the model. 
First, the frequency of environmental change is critical to the effectiveness of second-order 
adaptation. As the rate of environmental change increases, the process of second-order 
adaptation becomes relatively ineffective. More subtly, the size of the organization is also critical 
to the effectiveness of second-order adaptation. As observed in the previous section, there is a 
linear positive relationship between the size of the organization and the time periods for the 
second-order adaptation process to be effective. Thus, if the environment changes faster than the 
time it takes for second-order adaptation to work, we can expect such efforts to be futile. For 
instance, we ran a set of models setting N=60 and the probability of environmental change at 
0.20 and found that, on average, the initial population of 100 organizational forms reduced to 
only about 50, even in the context of hierarchical generative structures. Similarly, as the 
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radicality of environmental change declines, the efficacy of second-order adaptation efforts 
correspondingly improves. 
In sum, the process of second-order adaptation is effective when there is a hierarchical 
precedence structure underlying between-department interactions and the pace of environmental 
change is moderate.  Deviations from hierarchy lead to a complete collapse of the effectiveness 
of second-order adaptation in the context of tightly coupled structures. This finding regarding 
hierarchy formalizes Simon’s (1962) intuition that complex systems that are hierarchical tend to 
evolve faster and toward more stable structures. Hierarchy appears to be a necessary and 
sufficient condition for successful second-order adaptation. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, 
second-order adaptation is reasonably successful even when the generative structure is not 
hierarchical, but is loosely-coupled. We saw that, with a loosely-coupled structure, even when 
hierarchy is violated, the set of organizational forms reduces to a modest number (about 6 in the 
stable environment and about 30 in a changing environment). In contrast, the search process is 
less effective when the generative structure violates both hierarchy and loose-coupling. 
Apart from the diversity of organizational forms that are present, there is the important 
question of the degree of equifinality among these forms. Even if efforts at adaptive second-
order change prove unsuccessful or lead to a fixation on a structure inconsistent with the 
generative structure, this need not imply that such organizations will fail to engage in effective 
first-order change. We explore these issues in the next set of experiments. 
4.2.  Interaction between first-order and second-order adaptation  
As highlighted earlier, the extant literature on organization design offers ambiguous 
predictions on the relationship between first-order and second-order adaptation in complex 
organizations. The conditions under which they are substitutes and/or complements are yet 
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unclear. The set of experiments reported in this section is designed to clarify the interaction 
relationship between first-order and second-order adaptation efforts.  
Adaptation in loosely-coupled structures 
To explore the interaction between first-order and second-order adaptation, we preserved 
the process of second-order adaptation as implemented in experiment 1. In addition, we include 
the process of first-order adaptation. 
Figure 4 plots the average performance results from 100 runs of four models where the 
generative structure was loosely-coupled, both with and without hierarchy (i.e., Figures 1a-b) 
with an underlying structure of 5 departments (N=30). In two of the settings, there is a 
simultaneous process of first-order and second-order adaptation. In the other two settings, only 
first-order adaptation occurs and the organization persists in the initial random initialization of 
the department structure.   
<< Insert Figure 4 here >> 
Comparing the four models in Figure 4 suggests that first-order adaptation shares strong 
complementarities with second-order adaptation. In settings with both first-order and second-
order adaptation, performance not only increases faster, but also asymptotes at a higher level 
than in the case where there is first-order adaptation alone. However, a surprising and, in some 
sense, re-assuring finding is that the process of first-order adaptation continues to be quite useful 
even when the organization design is misaligned with the corresponding generative structure. 
This property manifests itself in two respects. First, even in the absence of second-order 
adaptation, in which case we know that in almost all circumstances the organizational structures 
that provide the context for first-order adaptation efforts are mis-specified, the process of local 
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adaptation is effective, reaching a performance level of 0.614 by the 100th period12. Second, 
when the generative structure is non-hierarchical, we know from the prior analysis that the 
process of second-order adaptation results in modest diversity in the set of organizational forms. 
Despite this, we find no significant performance differences between the hierarchical and non-
hierarchical structures. Thus, the process of second-order adaptation, even in non-hierarchical 
structures, is generally effective in discovering a small subset of functionally equivalent designs 
in that each of these designs tends to yield equivalent first-order adaptation benefits, lending 
some support to the principle of equifinality (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). At least in loosely-
coupled systems, it appears possible to realize the benefits of parallelism and localized 
adaptation even when the organization design is mis-aligned with environmental demands. 
Departures from hierarchy do, however, cause the process of first-order adaptation to be 
less monotonic, particularly in the absence of second-order adaptation. 13  In the absence of 
hierarchy, actors engage in local adaptation efforts that, ex post, turn out to be damaging to 
organizational performance as a whole. This is a consequence of the unanticipated and unknown 
reciprocal interactions between departments.  
Adaptation in tightly-coupled settings 
 We engaged in a parallel analysis in which the generative structure was tightly-coupled 
(Figures 1c-d). Figure 5 indicates the results of first-order adaptation in four tightly-coupled 
structures: hierarchical, with and without second-order adaptation; and, non-hierarchical, with 
and without second-order adaptation. The results here partially diverge from that observed in 
loosely-coupled structures. First, the non-monotonicity in organization performance over time is 
                                                 
12 Note that in this setting the performance asymptote is not reached by the 100th period. The process is still moving, 
though admittedly quite slowly, uphill. 
13 Indeed, the degree of non-monotonicity is somewhat masked by the fact that the reported results are averages over 
a 100 runs.  Single runs of the model exhibit a greater degree of non-monotonicity.   
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much greater. This is due to the fact that the likelihood of incorrect first-order adaptation efforts 
is increasing in the degree of coupling between departments. Second, we find that the 
complementarity between first-order and second-order adaptation is robust even in tightly-
coupled structures. First-order adaptation in conjunction with second-order adaptation tends to 
outperform the former alone.  
<< Insert Figure 5 here >> 
 These results lend robustness to the findings of the first set of experiments. If the 
condition of hierarchy is met, second-order adaptation is quite effective and first-order 
adaptation is then useful in generating performance improvements at the department level. 
Interestingly, we find that the performance asymptote (0.676) here is not statistically 
significantly different from the performance asymptote (0.684) in the case of loosely-coupled 
structures (see Figure 4). This suggests that if the underlying structure is hierarchical and 
designers engage in second-order adaptation, the success of first-order adaptation efforts is not 
sensitive to the degree of coupling.  
 However, the violation of hierarchy tends to be damaging to first-order adaptation efforts. 
The disruptive consequences of first-order adaptation when hierarchy is violated are somewhat 
mitigated by second-order adaptation. Even though we found that the initial diversity of 
organizational forms persists in the face of second-order adaptation in non-hierarchical and 
tightly-coupled structures, it seems that the identification of this subset of designs enhances the 
effectiveness of first-order adaptation as compared with the random grouping of functions in the 
case where organizations engage in first-order adaptation alone. Thus even when hierarchy is 
violated, the process of second-order adaptation is an extremely useful design activity since it 
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results in more orderly structures that facilitate the process of first-order adaptation. This 
strengthens our initial findings on equifinality in loosely-coupled structures. 
 In sum, the results in the stable environment indicate that second-order adaptation shares 
strong complementarities with first-order adaptation efforts. In the extreme case where the 
generative structures are neither hierarchical nor loosely-coupled, first-order adaptation efforts 
without second-order adaptation is largely futile. In general, the violation of hierarchy is less 
critical to first-order adaptation efforts than the violation of loose-coupling.  
4.2.1.  The impact of environmental change on the complementarity of first- and second-order 
adaptation 
 We found that first-order and second-order adaptation share strong complementarities in 
stable environments. Since environmental change renders second-order adaptation relatively less 
effective, we sought to examine whether the observed complementarity of first-order and 
second-order adaptation is robust in the presence of environmental change.  
 We replicated the experiments reported in §4.2 with the addition of environmental 
change set at ∆=0.05. As expected, the performance of organizations declined somewhat in a 
regime of modest environmental change. Otherwise the pattern of results14 for both loosely-
coupled structures and tightly-coupled structures were largely identical to that in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 respectively, with the complementarities between first-order and second-order 
adaptation largely robust to modest levels of environmental change.  
 In the first set of experiments that modeled the process of second-order adaptation alone, 
we saw that as the size of the organization and the probability of environmental change increase 
respectively, then the marginal value of second-order adaptation declines. The simple intuition 
here was that when the environment changes faster than the rate at which organizations can 
                                                 
14 These results are not attached due to space constraints. They are available with the authors on request. 
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effectively adapt in the space of organization designs, then such adaptations are likely to be futile 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). We examine this possibility here as well.  
 From an evolutionary standpoint, since selection will tend to favor higher performing 
organizations, if second-order adaptation generates performance gains, then organizations that 
engage in second-order adaptation will have an evolutionary edge over organizations that do not 
engage in second-order adaptation. Conversely, if increases in organization size and frequency of 
environmental change, respectively, obliterate the value of second-order adaptation, then we 
should find that such efforts at second-order change do not provide any evolutionary edge. In this 
case, we should find that organizations that are inertial, i.e., do not engage in second-order 
adaptation, should face no differential selection pressures as compared with organizations that do 
engage in second-order adaptation. We investigate this possibility by populating the landscape 
with 100 organizations with a randomly specified number and composition of departments and 
settings for the decision variables. We set N=60, D=5, and ∆=0.25. All 100 organizations engage 
in first-order adaptation, but 50 randomly selected organizations also engage in second-order 
adaptation every period while the remaining 50 are inert. In each period, 100 organizations are 
selected with replacement and we track the number of surviving organizations that are inert with 
respect to their structure and the number of survivors that engage in second-order adaptation. An 
increase in the population of inert firms would suggest that inert firms enjoy an evolutionary 
advantage, whereas a significant decrease would indicate an evolutionary disadvantage. 
<< Insert Figure 6 here >> 
 Figure 6 graphs the number of inert organizations that survive in each period of the 
simulation in each of the four generative structures. The results confirm the relative futility of 
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second-order adaptation15. The population of inert firms continues to drift randomly around 50, 
suggesting that they face no significant advantage or disadvantage as compared with firms that 
engage in second-order adaptation.  
 At the end of the experiment, there was no statistically significant difference in the 
average performance levels of the inert and non-inert organizations in all four structures. 
However, examining the variance in performance over the 50 simulation periods, we find that 
populations of organizations that include second-order adaptation exhibit twice the variance in 
performance as compared with organizational populations that remain inert with respect to their 
structure. This result confirms the intuition behind Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) argument that 
adaptation efforts in the space of organization forms reduces reliability rather than enhancing 
performance when the environment changes faster than the pace at which organizations adapt.  
 In sum, the results including environmental change suggest that when change is episodic 
and infrequent then the complementary effects of first-order and second-order adaptation are 
robust. However, as organizations grow larger (thus slowing the effectiveness of second-order 
adaptation) and the rate of environmental change increases, then second-order adaptation 
becomes largely ineffective. In such settings, the processes of first-order and second-order 
adaptation cease to be complements.  
<< Insert Table 1 here >> 
 Table 1 summarizes these results, the implications of which we discuss in the following 
section.  
                                                 
15 We ran these models for only 50 periods rather than 100 since there is no additional information conveyed in 
modeling the second 50 periods. Also, this analysis took about 200 hours to run on a state-of-the-art PC. Thus, 
reducing the simulated periods was a pragmatic concern as well. 
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5.  Discussion 
 The primary objective of this paper was to begin to explore a fundamental set of 
questions about organization design including the feasibility and value of design efforts (i.e., 
second-order adaptation) and the interrelationship between design efforts and incremental 
adaptation efforts (i.e., first-order adaptation). Simon argued strongly both that complex systems 
tend to be hierarchical and loosely-coupled (Simon, 1962) and that individual cognition is 
substantially bounded relative to the complexity of the task environments that people face 
(Simon, 1955; Simon, 1957). Again, for Simon, these two properties, one of systems and the 
other of individuals, raise the question to what extent is the architecture of complexity (i.e., 
hierarchy and decomposability) the ultimate arbiter of feasible and effective boundedly rational 
design efforts. This comprises a rather fundamental puzzle for modern organization theory as 
well. A puzzle closely related to the long-standing debate in the literature between contingency 
perspectives on organizational change that suggest both a high level of plasticity in organizations 
and, at least implicitly, a high level of cognitive reasoning on the part of managers and ecological 
perspectives that treat organizations as being relatively inert or subject to dysfunctional 
consequences as a result of change efforts. Our work seeks to engage these important questions 
in an even-handed manner that recognizes both the constraints on adaptation efforts and the 
importance of the structure of the firm’s task environment. 
 In general, we find that the underlying structure of complexity is an important 
determinant of the success of design efforts. In particular, hierarchy is shown to be a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the success of design efforts, in contrast to the relatively greater 
saliency given to the property of loose-coupling in this literature (Simon, 2002; Simon and Ando, 
1961). Loose-coupling, however, is shown to moderate the violation of hierarchy in terms of 
facilitating design efforts. This finding regarding the role of hierarchy and loose-coupling is 
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generally robust to both variations in the size of the organization and its complexity (i.e., number 
of departments and the nature of interaction between them). The principle of hierarchy (i.e., 
asymmetry in between-department interdependence) facilitates the process by which boundedly 
rational search on the space of organizational forms helps designers evolve toward and stabilize 
on appropriate forms. In contrast, in the absence of hierarchy (i.e., between-department 
interactions are reciprocal), the local search process never ceases searching for the appropriate 
assignment of decision choices to departments. Reciprocal interdependence triggers a cycling 
behavior wherein the reciprocally interdependent decisions are continually re-assigned from one 
department to another. The locally rational designers have no way of stopping this incessant 
searching. Thus, the appropriate design of non-hierarchic structures requires actors to have a 
sophisticated, perhaps implausibly so, global sense of the interdependencies. An empirical 
implication of this finding is that instances in which one observes an on-going pattern of 
organizational restructuring (see Eccles and Nohria, 1992) may stem from reciprocal 
interdependence among activities. In such settings, stability in organizational form can only 
result if the organization is willing to accept some degree of apparent mis-specification of the 
organizational structure.  
Thus, in terms of the chicken-and-egg dilemma that Simon posed, our analysis suggests 
that the underlying structure of complexity is an important arbiter of the success of human design 
efforts. Structures that are non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled do not easily lend themselves to 
effective analysis and design efforts; however, structures that are hierarchical (or if not 
hierarchical, loosely-coupled), are amenable to boundedly rational design efforts. Even in the 
case of non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled structures, the product of design efforts is still better 
than random designs. Though this is not observed in the reduction in diversity of organizational 
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forms, the usefulness of design efforts to first-order adaptation is clear from the results of 
experiment 3. Thus, we infer that the usefulness of boundedly rational design efforts is not 
limited to just hierarchical and loosely-coupled structures. It broadly extends to other structures 
that violate the two properties. The benefits, however, of design efforts differ both qualitatively 
and quantitatively across the four different structures. In this regard, our analysis helps formalize 
and extend Simon’s intuitions and provide some boundary conditions around the direction of 
causality between the architecture of complex systems and bounded rationality16.  
The second research question sought to examine how environmental change hampers the 
usefulness of design efforts. We find that the relative efficacy of adaptive efforts in hierarchical 
structures persists with moderate levels of environmental change. However, as the rate of 
environmental change increases or organizations get larger, the capacity to adapt effectively 
recedes. Our results, thus, provide a potential resolution to the ambiguous empirical findings in 
the literature on the effects of organizational change (see Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 371). When 
the rate of environmental change is modest, adaptation yields survival benefits. In contrast, when 
the rate of environmental change is aggressive, adaptation does not yield survival benefits. 
Similarly, larger organizations are slower to adapt suggesting that they are likely to be more 
vulnerable when environmental change is rapid. Perhaps the divergence in empirical findings is a 
function of examining different rates of environmental change or due to variations in 
organization size across studies.  
We also sought to examine the conditions under which design efforts (i.e., second-order 
adaptation) inhibit or facilitate the process of first-order adaptation. The main contingencies we 
                                                 
16 Note that in examining Simon’s chicken-and-egg dilemma we do not vary the extent of presumed rationality in 
search processes. However, holding the rationality underlying the search processes constant but varying the 
underlying architecture of complexity, allows us to address whether boundedly rational search processes are largely 
ineffective in settings that are non-hierarchical and non-decomposable. Thus, we are able to address the causality 
question without varying the rationality underlying the search processes.  
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examined were: (1) the four states of the world circumscribed by the two dimensions of 
complexity, i.e., hierarchy and degree of coupling; and, (2) frequency of environmental change. 
We find that first-order and second-order adaptation are generally complements, though second-
order adaptation by itself was completely ineffective in non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled 
structures. The degree of complementarity, though, depends on the nature of the underlying 
interaction structure. Whereas the complementarity is non-zero and highly positive in loosely-
coupled structures, it is significantly lower when the underlying structure is non-hierarchical and 
tightly-coupled. The reason we observe the complementarity is that second-order adaptation, 
even if unsuccessful, is reasonably effective in identifying the neighborhood of high performing 
organizational forms. From the standpoint of first-order adaptation, specifying a design that is in 
the vicinity of the correct design is still significantly better than a random configuration.  
An examination of the summary results in Table 1 reveals an interesting paradox. On the 
one hand, design efforts (second-order adaptation) are highly effective in hierarchical structures 
and less useful in non-hierarchical structures. This finding encourages design efforts in the 
former and cautions against it in the latter. On the other hand, first-order adaptation by itself is 
reasonably effective in loosely-coupled structures but completely ineffective in tightly coupled 
structures in the absence of second-order adaptation. From the standpoint of performance 
improvement through first-order adaptation, the success of design efforts in loosely-coupled 
structures is relatively less valuable than the imperfect design efforts in non-hierarchical and 
tightly-coupled structures. Thus, the results of first-order and second-order adaptation taken 
together suggest that incremental performance improvement efforts will benefit from 
organization design efforts even in non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled structures in spite of the 
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relative ineffectiveness of design efforts in such settings. The contingent quality of the 
architecture of complexity is starkly visible in this result. 
In a related vein, our results also re-affirm and formalize the intuition behind Simon’s 
architecture of complexity – the dual properties of hierarchy and near-decomposability. Whereas 
hierarchy is a necessary and sufficient condition for the success of design efforts (second-order 
adaptation), near decomposability is a necessary and sufficient condition for the success of 
incremental performance improvement efforts (first-order adaptation). If first-order and second-
order adaptation are both crucial activities of complex organizations, the dual properties of 
hierarchy and near decomposability are undeniably central to their architectures, though each 
plays a distinct role, a distinction that the prior literature had not clearly identified.  
Finally, the results of our analysis provide a useful micro-foundation for the burgeoning 
research on modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Garud, et al., 2001). Modularity is a design 
principle that advocates designing structures based on minimizing interdependence between 
modules and maximizing interdependence within modules. Much of the extant research on 
modularity has sought to contrast modular architectures with integrated architectures and 
document the benefits of modular designs. Little research has thus far grappled with the issue of 
whether and how good modular designs may be achieved in the face of complexity (Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004). This is an important question particularly if the benefits of modularity are 
contingent on achieving good modular designs. If such modular architectures are unrealizable 
through boundedly rational design efforts, then the benefits of modularity are moot. In this 
respect the results reported here are encouraging. We find that relatively local and incremental 
processes are capable of identifying useful, if not optimal, modules in structures that have some 
inherent hierarchy and decomposability.  
 42
Collectively, these are an important set of findings that bring to the surface the question 
of how boundedly rational actors are to design organizations that are intended to economize on 
the coordination capabilities of these actors. We show that organization design need not be the 
product of divine design but may derive from an evolutionary process. At the same time, the 
work leaves unanswered many other important questions. We have treated the design problem as 
one of discovering an unknown but latent generative structure. We have not addressed the 
possible endogeneity of the underlying interaction structure itself. Nevertheless, we view the 
current work as an important step forward in considering the search for the architecture of 
complex organizations. 
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Table 1  Summary of the results of the analyses 
Generative structure Second-order 
adaptation 
First-order 
adaptation 
Complementarity of first-order 
and second-order adaptation 
Hierarchical and 
loosely-coupled 
Effective Effective Strong 
Non-Hierarchical and 
loosely-coupled 
Moderately 
effective 
Effective Strong 
Hierarchical and 
tightly-coupled 
Effective Ineffective Strong 
Non-Hierarchical and 
tightly-coupled 
Ineffective Ineffective Moderately Strong 
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Figure 1a.  Hierarchical and loosely-coupled 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1   x x x         
a2 x  x x         
a3 x x  x         
a4 x x x          
b1       x x x     
b2 x    x  x x     
b3  x   x x  x     
b4     x x x      
c1        x   x x x 
c2         x  x x 
c3         x x  x 
c4       x  x x x  
Figure 1b. Non-hierarchical and loosely-coupled
 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1   x x x         
a2 x  x x   x      
a3 x x  x         
a4 x x x          
b1       x x x     
b2     x  x x     
b3  x   x x  x    x 
b4     x x x      
c1           x x x 
c2         x  x x 
c3         x x  x 
c4       x  x x x  
Figure 1d.  Non-hierarchical and tightly-coupled
 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1   x x x x  x      
a2 x  x x x x  x     
a3 x x  x  x x x     
a4 x x x  x  x      
b1 x x  x   x x x x x  x 
b2  x x  x  x x x  x  
b3 x  x x x x  x x x  x 
b4  x x  x x x   x x  
c1     x x x    x x x 
c2     x  x x x  x x 
c3      x  x x x  x 
c4     x  x  x x x  
Figure 1c.  Hierarchical and tightly-coupled 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1   x x x         
a2 x  x x         
a3 x x  x         
a4 x x x          
b1 x x x x   x x x     
b2 x x x x x  x x     
b3 x x x x x x  x     
b4 x x x x x x x      
c1     x x x x   x x x 
c2     x x x x x  x x 
c3     x x x x x x  x 
c4     x x x x x x x  
Figure 1f.  Typical perceived interaction matrix 
of decision choices at the start of the experiment
 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1    x         
a2       x     x 
a3     x    x x x  
a4 x            
b1   x      x x x  
b2        x     
b3  x          x 
b4      x       
c1   x  x     x x  
c2   x  x    x  x  
c3   x  x    x x   
c4  x     x      
Figure 1e.  Hierarchical and loosely-coupled 
structure after environmental change 
 a1 a2 b4 c2 a3 b1 b3 c1 a4 b2 c3 c4 
a1   x x x         
a2 x  x x         
b4 x x  x         
c2 x x x          
a3       x x x     
b1 x    x  x x     
b3  x   x x  x     
c1     x x x      
a4        x   x x x 
b2         x  x x 
c3         x x  x 
c4       x  x x x  
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Figure 2.  Second order adaptation in a stable environment D=5 and N=30 (100 firms, 100 runs)
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Figure 3.  Second order adaptation in a changing environment N=30, D=5, ∆=.05 (100 firms 100 
runs)
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Figure 4.  Adaptation in loosely-coupled structures in stable environments N=30, D=5 (100 runs)
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Figure 5.  Adaptation in tightly-coupled structures in stable environments N=30, D=5 (100 runs)
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Figure 6.  Adaptation and selection in changing environments N=60, D=5, ∆=0.25 (100 firms 100 
runs)
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Technical Appendix 
Modeling the generative structures 
Organizations are represented as making a set of N choices or decision variables [a1, a2, 
a3, …an]. In Figure 1a, the contribution of an individual decision variable, ai, depends on other 
decision variables. Thus, decision variable a1 depends on decision variables a2, a3, and a4. In 
contrast, decision variable b3 depends on 4 other decision variables (a2, b2, b3, b4).  As a result, 
decision variable a1 can result in 16 possible levels of performance, depending on its own value 
(a 0 or 1) and the value of the 3 other decision variables on which it depends, while decision 
variable b3 can take on 32 possible levels of performance, depending on its own value and the 
value of the 4 other decision variables on which it depends.  
 The performance contribution (ωi) of each decision choice (ai) is determined both by the 
state (0 or 1) of the ith decision choice and the states of the ‘j’ other decision choices on which it 
depends. Thus, 
ωi =  ωi(ai; ai1, ai2…ai j) 
 The value of ωi is treated as an i.i.d. random variable drawn from the uniform 
distribution17 U [0,1] for each configuration of ai and the ‘j’ other decision choices on which it 
depends. Organization performance Ω is a simple average of the ωi over the N decision choices. 
 
 
We also specified the number of departments and their composition (i.e., the decision 
variable(s) that would be assigned to a department). For an organization with N decision 
                                                 
17 The results are robust to alternative distributional assumptions. In particular, we have run the analysis with 
exponential and log-normal distributions and obtain results that are qualitatively similar to those reported here.  
These results are available with the authors. 
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variables we created ‘D’ departments, where the kth department Dk comprised (N/D) decision 
variables assigned at random. For a given value of N, we varied the value of D for robustness. 
We specified the interdependence between departments randomly. For instance, in experiments 
where Figure 1a characterized the organizational form, we randomly chose two decision 
variables from each department Di that affect two randomly chosen decision variables in 
department Dj (for all i<j). Similarly, in Figure 1b we randomly chose one policy each from 
departments Di and Dj that affect each other. More generally, overall interdependence in Figures 
1a and 1b (the loosely-coupled structures) was always equal and determined by the formula 
D[(N/D) * ((N/D) – 1)] + 2(D-1); where the first term captures the total interdependence within 
departments and the second term captures the level of interdependence between departments. 
Similar procedures were employed in specifying the between department interactions in Figures 
1c and 1d. Formally, the total interdependence in Figures 1c and 1d was always equal and 
represented as D[(N/D) * ((N/D) – 1)] + 2*[(N/D) * (N/D)]. The first term captures interdependence 
within departments and the second term the interdependence between departments.  
Second-order adaptation 
 The inferential process for second-order adaptation can be formalized as follows. 
Consider a set of decision variables that are perceived to belong to a department, γDaa ii ∈¬ ),( , 
where ai represents a focal decision choice and a¬i are the remaining set of decision choices 
within the department Dγ and the organization is defined by a set of departments, D = {Dα, Dβ, 
Dγ,…Dκ}. The performance of the department is given by );(1 ii
n
i
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where ‘nDγ’ is the 
number of decision choices in department Dγ. Now, consider a single decision variable, γDaj ∈ , 
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that is flipped to aj′ and the resulting performance of each decision choice in the department is 
observed. Then let A be defined as a set of all decision choices such that, 
 ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ∈≠= ¬¬¬¬ γωω DiallforaaaaaaaA jjiiijjiiii ),;(),;(: '  
 The set A identifies the set of all decision choices in Dγ whose performance changes as a 
result of flipping decision choice aj. The designers then adopt a simple rule that all decision 
choices that were unaffected by the search do not belong to the present department. All such 
decision choices are then either transferred to a randomly chosen different department or split 
into a separate department if it constitutes a large enough set.  The unchanged decision choices in 
Dγ are transferred into a randomly chosen other existing departments if they constitute less than 
half the total number of decisions in Dγ; otherwise, the unaffected decisions are split into a new 
department Dκ+1. If A is an empty set, it means that the performances of all remaining decision 
choices in Dγ, (a¬j), were unchanged by the flip in aj suggesting that aj does not belong to the 
department. Thus, aj is transferred to a randomly chosen department Dκ. More formally, if,  
A = { }, then κDa j ∈ , otherwise, 
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where, nA and nDγ, represent the number of decision choices in A and Dγ respectively. 
 In each period, we also consider combining each department with another randomly 
chosen department. The departments combine if changes in each department affect the other and 
remain separate otherwise. For instance, consider two teams representing two departments, Dα 
with decision choices [a1, a2, a3,…ai], and Dβ with decision choices [b1, b2, b3,…bj]. A randomly 
chosen decision choice from each department, ai and bj respectively, are flipped. The 
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departments Dα and Dβ combine to create a new department, Dγ if the performance of department 
Dβ  is affected by the flipping of ai and the performance of department Dα is affected by the 
flipping of bj. More formally, if 
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 Then, βαγ DDD U=  
First-order adaptation 
Formally, consider a decision choice κDa j ∈ is flipped to aj′. Then if, 
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Modeling environmental change 
 For an organization with N decision variables, we retained the ‘D’ departments that we 
specified at the start of the simulation and following every environmental change we again 
randomly re-assigned the (N/D) decision variables to each of the departments. We also re-
specified the interdependence between departments randomly. For instance, in experiments 
where Figure 1a was the generative structure, in the period when environmental change 
occurred, we again randomly chose two decision variables from each department Di that affects 
two randomly chosen decision variables in department Dj (for all i<j). Thus, following each 
environmental change, we re-specify the coupling of decision variables within departments and 
the nature of between-department interactions that makes up the generative structure. 
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Modeling selection 
We used the standard roulette wheel algorithm (Goldberg, 1989) for modeling selection. 
More formally, 
∑
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where, p(si), the probability of selecting the ith organization is given by the ratio of the 
performance, Ωi, of the ith organization to the total performance of all ‘S’ organizations in the 
population. The cumulative probability, P(si), is then computed as, 
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A total of ‘S’ random numbers ‘rS’ distributed i.i.d. in the interval [0, 1] are drawn and the 
organizations whose cumulative probability spans a random draw are selected according to the 
rule, )()( 1 iSi sPrsP ≤≤− . 
 
